Equal rights and strategies of the Swiss women’s movement (1975-1996)

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In Switzerland, it was not until 1971 that women acquired the right to vote at the national level and another ten years passed before the Swiss constitution was amended to include gender equality (in 1981). Considering the long-term societal and political resistance to women’s suffrage in Switzerland, it is not surprising that the driving force behind these political changes were the numerous women’s organisations and groups that make up the Swiss women’s movement. As elsewhere, these women’s organisations and groups have been very heterogeneous in their make-up. They reflect the varying interests and experiences. Moreover, they advance diverse political viewpoints and goals. In the late 1960s and early 1970s a new type of feminist group arising out of the 1968 movement surfaced in Switzerland, as they did in all Western countries. The majority of these new “radical feminists” viewed the legal system with wariness and usually refused to work within traditional political structures. Instead of participating in “direct democracy,” they considered the most effective means of change to be protest movements. However, some groups that represented this new feminism decided to support the campaign for an equal rights amendment by helping to collect signatures and by doing several public actions such as demonstrations. Banaszak (1996), for example, believes that their participation was fundamental for the success of the amendment of the constitutional article for equality which eventually passed in 1981. How could this be possible?

The following paper examines the apparent paradox of collaboration between Swiss bourgeois feminists, who had been active since the turn of the 19th century, and this new women’s radical movement, who had just emerged in the 1960s. More precisely, I will explore the campaign for constitutional equality in Switzerland and show how different feminist ideologies contributed to the movement’s strategy of obtaining equal rights for women through the legal system.

Before the 1970s, the women’s movement had most often worked within the legal system, and yet this changed with the new “radical feminist” movement. Studies on post-1968 autonomous radical feminists in West Europe and North America verify a high degree of the movement’s distrust of legal systems and traditional political channels (cf. Cott 1987; Bard 1995; Offen 2000). This attitude appears to be influenced by feminist theoretical analyses that were avidly discussed at the time. For example, analyses published during the late 1960s and the 1970s often presented the State as a patriarchal force which was (consciously) working against women’s liberation. Radical feminists condemned, in particular, the influence of liberal theories on the application of law. These theories postulated that equality and autonomy was attainable through the civil law but such theories did not account for any structural
gender inequalities that might hinder these goals (Bereni et al. 2010). Studies have confirmed a similar ambivalence among Swiss feminists towards political and legal structures in the 1970s (Broda et al., 1998). However, it is important not to oversimplify the picture. Feminist movements do not universally embody a singular, rigorous political position which does not change over time. Feminism entails varying co-existing interpretations and ideological differences. When looking at the complex and ambivalent relationship between legal structures and feminism, it is therefore important to distinguish between different feminist groups as well as between differing national contexts.

The findings discussed in this paper are based on two main methodological approaches: firstly, I incorporate the classical methods of historical analysis, evaluating written documents and oral history\(^4\), and, secondly, I evaluate the women’s movement, using the concept of field by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s notion of field must be understood as a microcosmic group, in which the members of this group share the same practice or interests. When this group is inserted in a global social space, it can operate relatively independently. It functions, moreover, with its physical, economic and especially symbolic power relations, linked, for example, to the volume and the structure of capitals owned by the different members) and its struggles for the conservation or the transformation of those power relations\(^5\) (Bourdieu 1994, 140; translation S.K.).

The field only exists when the participants in a social activity are in concurrence with each other to hold a dominant position while sharing common interests. This is what Bourdieu calls the “illusio” (illusion). This conceptual tool offers the advantage of depicting feminism not simply as a whole, but rather as a whole made of many elements in relation and in concurrence. Bourdieu’s field therefore represents the possibility to understand the women’s movement as a complex phenomenon. Conceiving feminism this way accentuates the concept of a milieu, encompassing varying interpretations and possible struggles to maintain a dominant position. With this approach, one can perceive the women’s movement as a whole, because Bourdieu’s concept can illustrate how the women’s movements share similar interests even if women’s groups assert different strategies. Here it is possible to understand the re-structuration and patterning of actors and ideas within feminism and to identify the different standpoints, strategies and areas of concurrence that exist within it.

When I started my research on the women’s movement in Switzerland, I was initially surprised by the number of existing groups which ideologically had very little in common. There also existed a high level of conflict within the groups which often led to members splitting off into smaller groups. Despite diverse underlying political ideals, these groups continued to pursue similar goals. By analysing these power relations in the field, I was able to gain insightful information about the very structure of Swiss feminism. Moreover, I analysed the changing views of the groups over time, and so I was able to follow the development of Swiss feminism over the years.
In the following, I will begin with a description of Swiss feminism in the late 1970s as the campaign for an equal right amendment in the constitution was first initiated. Next, I will discuss the paradox regarding the use of legal strategies by feminists. I will briefly review the evolution of the women’s movement in the years following the “Gleiche Rechte/Droits Égaux” campaign, and, finally, I explain how this evolution caused the radical women’s movement to work collaboratively with the Swiss bourgeois feminists.

The Swiss feminist field of the 1970s

Developments of the Swiss liberation movement differ from those in most Western countries in certain ways. In Switzerland, due to the late gain of female suffrage, the first two feminist “waves” arrived simultaneously instead of successively (see Freeman 1996; Lear 1968; Lovenduski 1986; Randall 1987). “Feminist waves” refer to the different phases of feminism in modern history. Indeed, the wave metaphor suggests that the phases, i.e. “waves” appear one after the other, just as waves in the ocean do. However, in the Swiss case, both movements were active at the same time. Thus, in the beginning of the 1970s, numerous groups could be found in Switzerland who were defending women’s rights and, in particular, were fighting for suffrage. If we analyse this movement using Bourdieu’s theoretical “field”, it becomes clear how dense and complex the movement was. Firstly, there was the Bund Schweizerischer Frauenorganisationen (BSF; also known as the Alliance de sociétés féminines suisses, ASF) as well as various regional suffrage leagues and the “Association pour les droits de la femme” (ADF). Although many of these women’s organisations and groups were already established at the end of the 19th century – e.g. the BSF was founded in 1900 and the Zurich regional suffrage leagues celebrated their 75th anniversary in 1968 – they continued to be a political force well into the 1970s and 1980s. This “first generation” women’s movement was initially composed of both working class and upper class women; hence, its experience and its interests were quite diverse. By the end of the 1960s, however, these women’s organisations had become more homogeneous in their composition, mainly comprised of middle- and upper-class women. The groups were inclined to use traditional political channels, lobby political representatives and – even though there was no strict consensus on this issue – these organisations tended to avoid confrontational strategies (cf. Mesmer 2007). These groups historically favoured strategies of negotiation and strived for political rights within the given legal system, but it would be wrong to say that radicalism was never part of their political actions. Indeed, certain groups and individuals randomly practiced radical strategies. For example, the Geneva activist Emilie Gourd also worked in alliance with the radical left (Hardmeier 1997, 343). However, it proved very difficult to be radical for the “first generation” of feminists, because this meant they had to break with their traditional role (and their own image) of being (proper) wives and mothers (ibid., 341). Their feminist ideals and actions sought change through the modification of constitutional texts and the direct action of the
state. These were traditional and socially acceptable tools of change (cf. Woodtli 1977; Schnegg/Stalder 1984; Broda et al. 1996; Redolfi 2000).

Two main equality concepts dominated the ideology of the organisations. The first one considered men and women as basically different, and women had a specific role in society based on their worth as mothers. The second concept of equality highlighted the belief of gender equality and rejected the strict gender dualism of the first interpretation. The initial suffrage movement in Switzerland appears to have navigated between these two positions. A similar oscillation can also be observed among the older feminists during the campaign for the equality amendment act in the 1980s. At times they held very progressive visions of men and women and promoted a break in traditional gender roles but at other times, they refused to question the traditional role of women as mothers and wives. It remains unclear to what extent this theoretical oscillation had been an instrument of strategic discourse to obtain ameliorations for women in a conservative country (Boucherin 2009, 84).

Secondly, younger feminists who were active in the early 1970s were usually women who participated in the 1968 movement, to whom I will refer here as the post-1968 feminists. Many of these women were strongly politicized by the 1968 movement and they felt that they had to respond to political forces that were not receptive to women’s claims for liberation but, instead, tended to reproduce patriarchal structures (Schär 2009, 179). The ideological affiliation of these new feminists with the 1968 movement remained evident. They were anti-authoritarian and anti-hierarchical, and they preferred provocative and spectacular actions in public spaces. These groups labelled themselves “mouvements de libération des femmes, MLF/Frauenbefreiungsbewegung, FBB” (women’s liberation movements) and believed in the radical transformation of the society as a whole. Despite all internal differences these post-1968 feminists shared a general distrust of the political elite and traditional political strategies such as bargaining politics. Most of them refused the use of traditional political tools to attain this new and better society. Radical feminists deemed such strategies as „reformist”, while their own actions were based on “revolution”. As in other countries, the post-1968 feminists in Switzerland were influenced by two ideological approaches: a radical approach and a neo-Marxist approach. For example, the Marxist group “Femmes en lutte/Frauen kämpfen mit” was founded by women who split off from larger women’s liberation organisations in different Swiss cities. They advocated the inclusion of class struggle in the women’s movement and they claimed that the problems posed by capitalism also caused women’s oppression. They identified themselves to be part of the new generation of feminists but with a strong Marxist orientation. Nevertheless, some of these neo-Marxist groups, like many of the radical feminists, started to collaborate with the suffrage movement to inscribe gender equality in the Constitution.

Finally, in addition to these two main ideological approaches in the late 1970s, the feminist field was also composed of several ideological sub-groups, which favoured different political strategies.

After obtaining the right to vote at the federal level in 1971, women in feminist organisations moved to the next necessary step to push for constitutional equal rights for women and men. As Jacqueline Berenstein-Wavre (2011) put it: “And suddenly, we have the right to vote at the federal level and my husband told me: now you can launch an initiative! We had no idea that we could do such a thing.” The idea of the equal right amendment was initially suggested by Lydia Benz-Burger, president of the Swiss Association for Women’s Rights (Association Suisse des droits de la femme / Schweizerischer Verband für Frauenrechte) in 1974. An initiative committee “Equal Rights” was formed shortly after the 4th Congress for Women’s Interests in Bern in 1975. The committee was composed of 15 women of different political affiliations and was to launch an initiative to amend Article 4 of the Swiss Constitution and add a paragraph that would determine that men and women have equal rights.

These equal rights would not only encompass family, education and employment in general, but it would also address equal salary. The committee was composed of women representing different political parties – the Social-Democratic Party as well as the liberal parties –, but also independent women, former activists for women’s suffrage and members of the working group related to the 4th Congress. The large majority of the committee members had been active in the traditional suffrage movement, and most of them were in their fifties or older. These women were accustomed to addressing their demands to the state via traditional channels, and so this new possibility of launching an initiative appeared to be a small revolution. Although initially the campaign was almost exclusively promoted by members of the traditional women’s movement, in 1976 several groups of the post-1968 feminists began to get involved in the collection of signatures. Zita Küng, the president of the “Organisation für die Sache der Frau” and former member of the women’s progressive party of Switzerland, “POCH-Frauen” commented in an interview that this group decided to participate in the campaign when it became evident that without their help, the initiative would not get enough signatures to be valid. In addition, younger women considered the traditional groups to be weak and to lack valuable grassroots experience, such as street actions. The younger women’s movement could provide this kind of experience.

The collaboration was successful and together the groups managed ultimately to collect 57,296 valid signatures which were handed over to the Federal Council at the end of 1976. These signatures initiated the “consultation procedure” which is a political procedure in Switzerland that then involves the consultation of most political parties, representatives of the cantonal authorities and different associations.

After having discussed the initiative for three years, the Federal Council decided in 1979 to submit a counter proposal. This alternative proposal deviated from the original proposal in one major point: While the initiative contained a “transitory disposition” stating that its goals should be achieved within a period of five years; the counter proposal gave no indication as to the period of time in which formal legal
equality was to be achieved. During the parliamentary debates the Social-Democratic Party and extreme left-wing politicians took clear positions in favour of the initiative’s proposal. Other political parties, however, supported the counter proposal. In the early 1980s, a great majority of the young feminists were explicitly in favour of the initiative. Some groups openly claimed they would only support the initiative and rejected any counter proposals by the Federal Council. On 17 May 1980 a demonstration was organised to criticise the counter proposal in which only groups from the post-1968 movement participated, such as the platform “Radikalfeministinnen” from Bern, Fribourg and Biel, the OFRA, the “dispensaire des femmes” in Geneva and extreme left-wing groups such as the RML. Fearing that the Swiss population would reject the amendment of Article 4 of the Swiss Constitution, if there were both their initiative and the counter proposal, the initiative committee decided to withdraw its initiative. In July 1980, however, a new committee was then formed, this time rallying women and men representing diverse political affiliations, from left-wing to right-wing, including trade unions and Christian parties as well as traditional feminist groups. There were only very few women from the post-1968 movement and similar younger women’s movement groups. The committee took on the name of “Interessengemeinschaft” and fought for the recognition of the counter proposal. The counter proposal was voted on and accepted by the Swiss people on 14 June 1981.

The initiative campaign illustrates an apparent paradox: Although initiated by women representing traditional political parties and women’s groups, in particular, the suffrage movement, feminist groups and individuals from the post-1968 generation also became involved in this action. At the same time, this appears to be a contradiction: some members of the suffrage movement refused to support the idea of the equality initiative initially discussed at the 4th Congress for Women’s Interests (see Joris 2009, 242f.). How can we explain this paradox in behaviour?

Considering the strategies and ideologies of the post-1968 feminists participating in the initiative campaign, at least two aspects appear problematic: First of all, if radical women participate in actions to obtain more rights for women by using traditional legal means defined by feminist analysis as androcentric, their “means” might also be andocentric. Secondly, the modification of the Swiss Constitution without proposing strategies to promote a radical social change, could not – according to radical feminism understanding – seriously challenge the patriarchal system. For these reasons, a large portion of the post-1968 women’s liberation groups ignored this initiative. Indeed, researching in the internal archives of some of the most important women’s liberation groups in major Swiss cities, I found that there was no mentioning of this initiative during the entire campaign between 1975 and 1981, even though it was largely discussed in the parliament and the press at that time. A former activist of the radical Women’s Liberation Movement (MLF) of Geneva explained that the group refused to get involved in the campaign since the question of “equality” was typically seen as “reformist” issue. In spite of this, and paradoxically, this very per-
son was very active in the equality campaign. As a member of MLF, she simultane­ously acted as the initiative’s coordinator for the French part of Switzerland.

My analysis, furthermore, confirms that the reliance on the legal strategies within traditional political structures is actually not an exception to the rule. Indeed, several other groups linked to the new generation of feminists, which shared more or less the ideas of radical feminism, actively participated in the equality campaign. This was the first official collaborative work between the traditional and the post-1968 feminists. This collaboration also went much further than simply canvassing for the collection of signatures; the young feminists participated in the organisation of a national alliance and public demonstrations as well. Several members of regional FBB and MLF groups took an official stand in favour of the initiative in the early 1980s.

Other groups such as the “dispensaire des femmes” in Geneva focused on women’s health issues, actively participated in the campaign as well. On the other hand, key women’s liberation groups, such as FBB and MLF based in Zurich and Geneva, are not mentioned in the campaign’s documentation. The following elements help to understand these apparent inconsistencies. Firstly, it is useful to remember that the post-1968 feminists in Switzerland felt quite ambiva­lent towards the law and the political institutions (Broda at al., 1998). The relationship of radical feminism with the State was never straightforward. For example, in the late 1960s the Zurich’s FBB and Geneva’s MLF undertook various actions to underscore publicly that the resolution of the suffrage issue would not change women’s situation that much. However, in 1969, the young feminists helped organise the “March on Bern” to protest Switzerland’s ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights with an exemption regarding women’s suffrage. Other issues, such as the legalisation of abortion, have also triggered apparent paradoxes: in spite of its mistrust in the legal system, the post-1968 movement started an initiative as part of its campaign to decriminalize abortion. Thus, the history of the women’s liberation move­ments shows that using legal means to achieve feminists’ objectives, even if strongly criticised, is, in a certain way, part of Switzerland’s radical feminists’ strategies.

Secondly, several groups and individuals who participated in the campaign to amend Article 4 and who contributed considerably to the successful collection of signatures represented smaller regional groups (FBB/MLF) and fringe groups of a larger or­ganisation. One such group was the Organisation für die Sache der Frauen (OFRA). Its members mostly split off from the progressive group “Progressive Frauen Schweiz” (POCH-Frauen) and similar groups privileging a Socialist understanding of femi­nism (Lenzin, 2000). Their aim was to create an alternative to the women’s liber­ation movement. This movement was supposed to be without confining structures, unorganised and, as the former president of the OFRA called it, “fuzzy”. Moreover, OFRA regularly worked with traditional political tools such as the initiative, for example, on the issue of paid maternity leave in the late 1970s. OFRA belongs to those women’s groups that clearly position themselves in favour of the initiative; in addition, OFRA ensured the national coordination of the campaign.
Based on the analysis of OFRA and similar groups, I hypothesize that the further away a group situates itself from “mainstream” radical feminism, the more likely it was to participate in the initiative. Marxist groups in particular – whether feminists or not – positioned themselves publicly in favour of the initiative; e.g. the “Ligue marxiste révolutionnaire/Revolutionäre Marxistische Liga” and the “Femmes en lutte/Frauen kämpfen mit”.

Thirdly, and surprisingly, I found that the question of ideology can improve our understanding of the behavioural paradox. The initiative committee argued in favour of “freedom of choice”: i.e. people should be able to choose their core occupation, whether it is taking care of children or working outside the household. The initiative’s text insisted on the idea that men and women should share duties in the family independently of their gender. Advocates of the initiative also questioned women’s traditional household obligations: “No one is forcing a housewife, on the basis of the Constitutional Article, to work outside the house, but the law shouldn’t force her only to do the housework”. While, on the one hand, this conception fundamentally harmonized with the traditional Swiss norm of the family, composed of husband, wife and children, on the other hand, it was also quite progressive at the time, especially coming from the traditional feminist groups. The initiative also brought up the issue of paid work by demanding equal pay, which was an important topic for the post-1968 movement.

During the “Gleiche Rechte/Droits Égaux” campaign, however, tension between the feminist ideologies did arise, particularly regarding issues around strategies. While the idea of incorporating gender equality into the Constitution seemed reformist to the post-1968 movement, the traditional women’s groups feared the extreme ideology from the young feminists. Traditional feminist groups avoided appearing publicly in extreme leftist feminist demonstrations that support the initiative, for example. During a demonstration organised by post-1968 feminists in June 1980 in Bern, those tensions became quite visible. Traditional feminists refused to march alongside “leftists” and this oddly resulted in a demonstration to support the gender equality initiative in which the initiators themselves were absent!

The end of the paradox. Transformation of the feminist field from the 1980s to the mid-1990s

My analysis of the initiative “Gleiche Rechte/Droits Égaux” seems to imply that Swiss radical feminists’ notorious aloofness towards the traditional political structures might be more of an academic standpoint than one of political practice. However, my research tends to show that also the specific history, ideological context and the relation of post-1968 feminist groups to radical feminism influenced groups’ and individuals’ decision to contribute – or not – to the campaign. In other words, the less a feminist group identified with radical feminism, the more it would embrace the equality initiative.

Radical feminist organisations (e.g. MLF of Geneva) usually focused on sexuality and body issues and these had been key issues of the women’s liberation move-
ments until the 1980’s. Such groups clearly distanced themselves from the initiative without arguing against it. Although in the past they had demonstrated a great reluctance to become involved in this kind of initiative, the interest of other, smaller post-1968 groups, (e.g. some MLF/FBB from smaller cities, the OFRA, the “Radi-kalfeministinnen”, the “Femmes en Luttes/Frauen kämpfen mit”) was very real.

It must be noted once again that the amendment wording fundamentally broke with the more traditional concepts of gender roles. The traditional role of the mother had rarely been questioned by suffrage groups. Thus, the demand for freedom of choice and the possibility to switch the traditional roles in the family made the initiative in the Swiss context quite progressive. However, at the same time, the initiative was not radical enough for some radical feminists. This explains why some post-1968 feminists were interested in the campaign, while others were not.

Bourdieu’s concept of field helps to illustrate the kinds of involvement of different feminist groups in the campaign. I analysed the motivation behind different group’s participation. In some cases, their lack of participation can be assessed to a certain extent because radical groups had different strategies than traditional women’s movements and neo-Marxist women’s movements. Finally, Bourdieu’s concept of field demonstrates the importance of understanding feminism as a heterogeneous entity. To understand the evolution of feminism during the years following the initiative, the concept of field also offers conceptual advantages. Summarising the period of the initiative campaign, the field was initially dominated by radical feminism but also witnessed an upsurge in all women’s liberation groups. Several groups came up with similar (political) interpretations that supported the initiative for equality, not only the traditional suffrage movement and the post-1968 feminists. Power relations were indeed at stake here: each group and feminist group fought for legitimacy and the promotion of its own political vision. However, they were rarely on a par in regard to resources (membership as well as economic resources) and legitimacy.

Neo-Marxist groups developed out of the women’s liberation movement. The OFRA evolved from the Progressive Women of Switzerland (POCH-Frauen). Marxist feminism always remained on the fringes. Groups such as the OFRA eventually attained a more dominant position, after the women’s movements collapsed when former members joined political parties, trade unions or even universities. In the years to follow, the field moved towards institutionalisation: some women started to get professional opportunities in the field of feminism; while new professionalized structures emerged, such as women’s shelters or government offices that regulated equality (Gleichstellungsbüro, bureaux de l’égalité). Other women started the field of academic gender studies. This trend was already evident in the late 1970s when OFRA, a group willing to work through traditional political channels, appeared in the feminist field. The strategies and organisation of this group (rather than the group itself) became dominant: Women’s groups began to seriously dialogue with state authorities, and they started to develop into well-organised, well-structured, and professionalised groups (OFRA was the first post-1968 feminist group which employed
a paid secretary). Thus, the initiative campaign and the paradoxical engagement of the post-1968 movement can also be explained in the context of these changes in the field of feminism. Indeed, the field was already reconfiguring itself in the 1980s, after ten years, the political presence of the radical women’s movement was on its decline. At that time, the use of traditional political channels by feminists started to prevail. These reconfigurations of the field might explain the mounting interest of various groups of the feminist movements after 1975 for the equality campaign.

Notes
1 I would like to thank Gesine Fuchs and Sabine Berghahn for their support and helpful remarks concerning this article and my PhD thesis.
2 Some Swiss women had the vote on a cantonal level earlier than 1971. The first canton to give the right to vote to women was Vaud in 1959 and the last one was Appenzell Innerrhoden in 1990, by decision of the Federal Court (BGE 116 Ia 359).
3 This article is based on my PhD research, which I began in 2009 and which is still in progress. My doctorate is supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation and is part of a more extensive project at the University of Bern which examines the impact of the women’s movement on Swiss society; see (SNSF): www.hist.unibe.ch/content/forschungsprojekte/frauenbewegung_1968_2002/index_ger.html.
4 The materials used here include archival material from different feminist groups found in the Sozialarchiv in Zurich, the Swiss Federal Archives in Bern, the Gosteli Foundation in Bern, the Archives du Mouvement de Libération des Femmes MLF in Geneva as well as twelve personally conducted interviews with activists.
5 Original text: “... avec ses rapports de force physique, économique et surtout symbolique (liés par exemple au volume et à la structure des capitaux possédés par les différents membres) et ses luttes pour la conservation ou la transformation de ces rapports de force”.
6 The use of post-1968 avoids the problematic metaphor of the “wave” since the first two “waves” were active in Switzerland at the same time. Thus, there are not two “moments” of protest but rather two different conceptions co-existing. For this reason, this North American concept of the historical development of feminism does not seem to be an adequate model for Switzerland. However, the metaphor can be useful in illustrating that both “waves” have different cognitive orientations. See Laughlin et al., 2010.
7 Berenstein-Wavre is the former vice-president of the initiative committee Equal Rights. Switzerland has two main instruments of direct democracy at federal level: initiative and referendum. The referendum can abrogate a law. Here, 50,000 signatures must be collected within a 100-day time limit in order to submit the law to a popular vote. With the initiative, citizens (100,000 signatures required) may propose an amendment to the Swiss Constitution. The federal parliament is obliged to discuss the initiative. It can recommend or reject it, or it may propose an alternative before the initiative is put to the vote.
8 The text of the Initiative for Equal Rights as published in 1976 states: “Men and women are equal. Men and women have the same rights and duties in the family. Men and women can claim the same salary for equivalent work. Men and women can claim equal opportunities and equal treatment in education, school and professional training, employment and occupation” (translation S.K.).
9 Interview with Zita Küng, 15 July 2011, Zurich.
10 In a situation where an initiative and a counter proposal are simultaneously introduced, frequently both are rejected in a popular vote. In 1987 the possibility of a “double yes” was introduced: voters could vote in favour of both an initiative and the counter proposal, but they must declare which proposal they prefer. In the end, the proposal receiving the majority of the votes is accepted.
11 The only representative coming from this political corner appears to be Martine Chaponnière, member of the women’s liberation movement of Geneva.
12 Translated: Community of Interests.
Interview with Martine Chaponnière, 3 November 2010, Geneva.

See, for example, the document "Stimmberechtigt und wahlberechtigt heisst nicht gleichberechtigt sein!", 70.6.C*5, Sozialarchiv Zürich.

Interview with Zita Küng, 15 July 2011, Zurich.

See, for example, Stellungnahme der OFRA Ar.55. 30. 19, Sozialarchiv, Zürich.

"Égalité des droits entre hommes et femmes", "Alliance des sociétés féminines suisses", Sozialarchiv, Ar. 29.70.3

We can find several letters written by different parties about this demonstration in the archives and in the press.

References


Gleichstellung als Sonderfall?

Zur Vollzugsproblematik am Beispiel des Gleichstellungsgesetzes der Schweiz

NATALIE IMBODEN. CHRISTINE MICHEL


Augenfällig ist die schwache Verknüpfung der offiziellen Gleichstellungspolitik mit der Vertragspolitik der Sozialpartner und die fehlende Einbettung in sonst vorhan-