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Graycar, Adam (Ed.) (2020). *Handbook of Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 512 pp. ISBN: 978 1 78990 090 3.

Zusammenfassung

Das Handbook of Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration wird ein zentrales neues Nachschlagewerk sein für Wissenschaftler*innen, die öffentliche Verwaltungsforschung und Korruptionsstudien zu verbinden suchen. Der Band befasst sich mit dem Kontext der öffentlichen Verwaltung, seinem Wandel und den jeweiligen Auswirkungen auf Korruptionsrisiken; er untersucht Korruptionsfragen nach Politikfeldern und bietet damit einen neuartigen, von der Politik- und Verwaltungsforschung inspirierten Ansatz für Korruptionsstudien; er bietet eine internationale Übersicht von Anti-Korruptionsreformen aus zwölf Ländern; und er endet mit innovativen Diskussionen zu Erfahrungswerten und Erfolgsfaktoren der Korruptionsbekämpfung sowie mit Schlüsselkonzepten wie „Interessenkonflikten" und „Integrität" in der öffentlichen Verwaltung. Das Handbuch entwickelt abschließend Vorschläge, wie die Korruptions- und öffentliche Verwaltungsforschung sich gegenseitig weiter inspirieren und informieren können, insbesondere in Bezug auf die Messung von Korruption und die Auswirkungen von institutionellen Arrangements und Managementpraktiken in der öffentlichen Verwaltung.

The Handbook of Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration will be an essential new reference for research that seeks to bridge interest in public administration and corruption. It is a most welcome addition that sits at the intersection of edited collection on corruption such as the Handbooks of Political Corruption and the Economics of Corruption (Heywood, 2015; Rose-Ackerman, 2006), on the one hand, and Handbooks of Public Management, Public Administration and Public Policy (Ferlie, Lynn & Pollitt, 2007; Goodin, Moran & Rein, 2008; Peters & Pierre, 2012; Ongaro & van Thiel, 2018) and more specialised texts on Public Service Ethics (Bowman & West, 2018).

Following an introduction by Adam Graycar on the importance of studying corruption in public administration, the volume explores the issue across four parts, 32 chapters and nearly 500 pages. The first part focuses on 'public administration and its vulnerabilities' to corruption. It addresses the impact of the changing context of public administration, for instance, the role of 'megatrends' such as the rise of digital networks, social media and big data (Zeger van der Wal), corruption risks involved in policy-making and implementation (Michael Howlett), and, more specifically, the dangers emanating from the infiltration of public administration by organised crime networks (Russell G. Smith, Tony Oberman and Georgina Fuller).

The most important chapter in the first part is, arguably, the development of a typology of anti-corruption instruments (Jean-Patrick Villeneuve, Giulia Mugellini and Marlen Heide). The typology is based on theories of policy tools and instruments (Howlett, 2010) and, hence, lends a specific public policy and administration perspective to the analysis of international and national anti-corruption convention and regimes. The typology will be valuable for future research in that it provides a systematic framework for the analysis of anti-corruption reforms at the country and sectoral levels (see below).

The second part examines corruption issues at the level of policy sectors, providing an innovative approach to corruption studies that has much to benefit from public policy and administration research. Studies of corruption have increasingly criticised the cross-national study of corruption without, sufficiently, taking into account that corruption varies greatly within countries across levels of government, policy sectors and institutions (Heywood, 2017). Mark Pyman expertly lays out the rationale for the study of corruption by sector and provides a framework for application (for further detail, see also the very detailed web site Curbing Corruption).

The subsequent chapters present a mix of sectoral studies ranging from healthcare to taxation, education, environmental protection, police and local government. The chapters vary in focus. For example, the chapter on corruption in the police and law enforcement focuses on the measurement of police integrity (Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic), the chapter on education provides a detailed account of corruption issues in the higher education sector (Stephen Heyneman), and the study of the tax administration provides a hands-on approach of how the analysis of business processes can help identify and fix corruption risks (Tuan Minh Le and Beytullah Sarican).

The third part of the volume presents case studies of corruption from around the world. It combines developing countries (e. g. Ghana and Uganda), major emerging economies (e. g. China and India) and developed countries (e. g. Australia), examples from Western Europe (e. g. the Netherlands) and post-communist Europe (e. g. Croatia and Lithuania) as well as international leaders of anti-corruption reform (e. g. Singapore) to draw lessons across countries.

The case studies provide a helpful starting point for anybody who wants to learn more about corruption and anti-corruption reforms in individual countries. The case studies do not follow a shared framework to allow for comparability across cases. Yet they help shed light on different aspects of corruption and anti-corruption reform. The Mexican case, for example, pays more attention to variety of corruption problems and the role of organised crime and drug cartels. Other case studies such as Lithuania focus on the effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms, while the Ukrainian case study takes a broader perspective on public administration reform and its relevance for the fight against corruption.

The last part of the handbook addresses 'responses to corruption in public administration'. It contains some of the most innovative chapters of the volume. Following an evaluation of 'what works' in anti-corruption reform from a global perspective, contributions zoom in on issues of defining and regulating conflict of interest, establishing effective whistleblowing systems and drawing lessons from criminological theory for the study of corruption in public administration.

The two chapters by Leo Huberts and André van Montfort and by Nikolas Kirby provide a fitting conclusion to the volume. They focus on the concept of integrity and

approaches to ethics and integrity management in public administration. They resonate with a wider shift of research away from the concept of corruption, including its negative connotation, to more positive concepts of integrity and public service ethics. For students of public administration, this shift is intuitive insofar as concepts of public service motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990), public values (Beck-Joergensen & Bozeman, 2007) and public service ethos (Rayner, Williams, Lawton & Allinson, 2011) are foundational for the study of public administration and management. In short, corruption research has potentially much to learn from public administration – and vice versa.

Overall, the volume, therefore, establishes a valuable bridge between different areas of social science inquiry. This being said, the range of pillars connecting the bridge between corruption and public administration could be extended and the handbook provides the basis for it. First, from the point of view of public administration and public management research, the volume pays conspicuously little attention to the relation between models of public administration and corruption. Max Weber, one of the founding fathers of the study of public administration, was prominently concerned with questions of public service ethics. Indeed, a Weberian bureaucracy remains the ideal model of bureaucracy to contain corruption in developing and developed countries (Rauch & Evans, 2000).

Alternative models of bureaucracy such as the New Public Management are referred to by individual chapters. For instance, Elizabeth David-Barrett stresses the multiplication of conflicts of interest of public officials as a result of the changing boundaries between public and private sector following the implementation of New Public Management reforms.

Yet, wider questions regarding the relation between models of public administration, corruption, ethics and integrity in the public service remain on the agenda for future research. If Weberian bureaucracies are associated with less corruption in the public sector, which areas of management are most relevant? Do recruitment and selection chiefly determine the level of corruption in a country, sector or institution? What is the role of wage levels and salary management practices? Does performance management facilitate or help curb corruption? Are Weberian bureaucracies equally effective in containing corruption and promoting integrity in Western developed democracies and in developing countries?

We still know little about these questions. James Rauch and Peter Evans' (2000) foundational study of bureaucracy, economic growth and corruption pointed to the importance of merit recruitment and permanent tenure (see also Dahlstroem, Lapuente & Teorell, 2012). More recent research by Christian Schuster, Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling and Kim S. Mikkelsen (2020) confirmed that merit recruitment is associated with less corruption in the public service in developing countries. By contrast, the finding does not extend to OECD countries. Moreover, the role of employment terms is ambivalent. In developing countries, employment on the basis of permanent contracts is sometimes but not always associated with less corruption. In OECD countries, they do not find a significant association between permanent employment contracts and corruption.

Conversely, from the perspective of corruption studies, public administration research would arguably benefit from further discussion of the concept and measurement of corruption and integrity. The introduction by Graycar as well as several chapters discuss the complexity and multiple forms and faces of corruption. Yet, corruption is inherently difficult to measure. Corruption Perception Indices (CPI) such as Transpar-

ency International's CPI have helped put the problem of corruption onto the agenda of academic research, international organisations, policy makers and advocacy groups. Yet, the focus on perception and on country level estimates also turns these indices into unreliable measurement tools.

Recent corruption research has come up with alternative measures of corruption. For instance, Mihaly Fazekas and colleagues examine public procurement data to identify 'red flags' in the procurement process and link them to the lack of competition and the recurrent award of contracts to the same companies. Given the public availability of procurement data, this indicator allows for comparison across countries both in Europe and in developing countries (Fazekas, Toth & King, 2016; David-Barrett, Fazekas, Hellmann, Mark & McCorley, 2020), across sectors and across time and is surely more reliable than country wide perception indices.

Where administrative data is unavailable, corruption researchers have borrowed from behavioural economics to conduct lab or lab-in-the-field experiments in order to generate new measures of honesty and corruption. Aasmus L. Olsen, Frederik Hjorth, Nikolaj Harmon and Sebastian Barfort (2019) have recently introduced this approach to the study of public administration. They apply the paradigmatic die-roll game (Fischbacher & Foellmi-Heusi, 2013) to study behavioural honesty among students who seek employment in the public sector. In the game, subjects are asked to roll a die in a cup. They then receive a payment based on the number they rolled. For instance, for a 1 they receive 1 money unit, for a 2 they receive 2 money units and so on. Critically, only the subject knows precisely what number he or she has rolled. Dishonest reporting is not punished nor can it be observed by the experimenter. Income-maximising individuals therefore have an incentive to report the number that gives them the highest monetary reward.

The die-roll game does not allow for the identification of dishonest behaviour at the individual level. However, it is informative at the aggregate level. If all subjects report honestly, we expect an equal distribution of the numbers from 1 to 6. If the actual distribution of numbers differs, it must be down to cheating by the participants of the die-roll game.

Behavioural games of this kind have traditionally been used in lab environments with student populations. However, they have recently been applied to study behavioural honesty of 'real' public servants (Meyer-Sahling, Mikkelsen, Schuster, Seim & Sigman, 2021) and, by implication, shed new light on the challenge of measuring unethical behaviour in the public service.

The reliance on administrative data and the design of behavioural games may not always be available to public administration researchers. The chapter by Kutnjak and Ivkovic on police integrity stands out in the volume insofar as it presents a survey instrument to measure unethical behaviour of public servants. Surveys suffer from a number of measurement challenges, in particular, the problem of social desirability bias. Because corruption shares a negative connotation and admission to corrupt behaviour, usually, implies the initiation of disciplinary and even criminal proceedings, survey respondents in the public service have little incentive to answer questions about corruption truthfully.

Recent advances in survey design have sought to address these problems. In particular, sensitive survey techniques (e. g. Oliveros, 2016) such as list experiments (so-called item count techniques) protect respondents and therefore raise the prospect of

generating more truthful answers from public servants about their own experience with corruption and the prevalence of corruption in the public service.

In sum, corruption research has much to offer for research in public administration and vice versa. The volume presents a valuable and essential source for everyone interested in the study of corruption, ethics and integrity in public administration.

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